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1970] ·CASE COMMENTS 
CoNCLUSION 
It appears that a reservist does not have rights protected to the 
same degree by the Constitution as do his fellow citizens who are 
civilians. Likewise, his access to the courts for review of administra-
tive proceedings appears more constricted than his civilian counter-
part. The terms of the very agreement he signed that made him a 
member of the reserves are subject to modification by Congress in 
the exercise of some paramount sovereign power. These impair-
ments of liberty are adequately justified by the courts; indeed 
there are few citizens who would question the need of the military 
for discipline at the expense of some individual liberties. 
Problems sometimes arise when the soldier is also a civilian, or 
perhaps, when he is neither soldier nor civilian, but in limbo bet-
ween the two worlds and forced to live in both. For exam-
ple, he is subject to the same rigid discipline as a full-time soldier, 
but only for a few days each month. The effects of this discipline,· 
however, often persist beyond the end of his drill (a man with short 
hair on the week.end rarely has long hair the following week., though 
he has the same freedom to wear lo_ng hair then as any civilian) . 
· Problems involving reservists multiplied with the Viet Nam 
War; after its end we shall see a corresponding reduction in litiga-
tion. These problems have helped define more clearly the rights 
and obligations of reservists. 
William Robert Wooton 
Constitutional Law - Judicial Review of 
Congressional Membership Exclusion 
Adam Clayton Powell, Jr. was duly elected from the 
Eighteenth Congressional District of New York to serve in the 
House of Representatives for the Ninetieth Congress. During the 
Eighty-ninth Congress, a special subcommittee of the ~ouse had 
reported that the Committee on Education and· Labor, of which 
Powell was chairman, had deceived the House authorities as to 
travel expenses and, additionally, that there was strong evidence 
that Powell had directed illegal salanr payments to his wife. Con-
sequently, when the Ninetieth Congress organized in January, 1967; 
the oath was not administered to Powell. On February 23, 1967, a 
select committee of the Ninetieth Congress issued a report, finding 
j:11, 
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that Powell met the standing qualifications of the Constitution,' 
but that he had asserted unwarranted privileges and immunities 
from the processes of the New York courts and had wrongfully 
used House funds. On March l, 1967, the House, purporting to act 
under constitutional authority; excluded Powell by a vote of 307-
116. Powell then filed suit in federal district court, claiming that the 
House could exclude him only if he failed to meet the standing 
constitutional qualifications of age, citizenship and residency, all 
of which the House specifically found that Powell met. The district 
court dismissed the petitioners' complaint for want of subject 
matter jurisdiction and the court of appeals affirmed in part, rever-
sed in part. The Supreme Court granted certiorari. Held, reversed. 
The Court declared that the House exceeded its authority in the 
exchision of Powell. In response to petitioners' request for additional 
equitable relief, including mandamus for back pay, the Court 
reversed and remanded. Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486 (1969). 
The Powell case presented the Court with at least five major 
questions. First, was Powell's claim rendered moot by his subsequent 
election to and seating in the Ninety-first Congress? Second, were 
the respondents immune from judicial review by virtue of the 
speech and debate clause of the Constitution? Third, was the House 
authority to exclude in its authority to expel? Fourth, did the Court 
lack subject matter jurisdiction? Fifth, was the case non-justiciable 
as a "political question"?" The Court considered each of these ques- _ 
tions at length and answered all of them in the negative. The scope 
of this comment, however, is limited to the Court's discussion of 
the political question doctrine. 
Respondents maintained that even if the case were otherwise 
justiciable, it presented only a political question: which, by well-
established principle, federal courts will not adjudicate.• Writing 
'US. CoNST. art. I, § 2 provides as follows: ''No Person shall be a Representa-
tive who shall not have attained to the age of twenty·flve Years, and been seven 
Years a Citizen of the United States, and who shall not, when elected, be an 
Inhibitant of that State in whi.ch he shall be chosen." 
• U.S. CoNST. art. I§ 5 provides as follows: "Each House shall be the 
Judge of the Elections, Returns, and Qualifications of its own Members .... " 
• Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 495 (1969). 
"Id. at 518. , 
• In Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (7 How.) l (1849), the first important United 
States case to apply the doctrine of non•intervention with political questions, 
the Court declined to determine which of two Rhode Island governments was 
the legitimate one. Over a half century later, the Court declared that the 
question of who is the de facto or de jure sovereign of a territory ii; a political 
question, the legislative or executive determination of which binds the judge;. 
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for the Court, Chief Justice Warren relied on the legislative appor-
tionment case of Baker v. Carr' for a functional definition of a 
"political question": In the Baker majority opinion, Mr. Justice 
Brennan had noted that" [t]he nortjusticiability of a political ques-
tion is primarily a function of the separation of powers."" The Baker 
Court then specified that a question was "political" when there 
existed "a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of 
the issue to a coordinate political department."' This definition of a 
political question primarily bars judicial review of the actions of a 
coordinate branch of government. Mr. Justice Brennan rejected the 
traditional categorization•• of political question issues and called 
for a determination of justiciability on an ad hoc basis.'' 
In the Powell case, the respondents argued that the case pre-
sented a political question because there is a textually demonstrable 
commitment to the House of Representatives of the "adjudicatory 
power" to determine Powell's qualifications." The Court was, 
therefore, called upon to determine for the first time the scope of 
Detjen v. Central Leathe1· Co., 246 U.S. 297, 302 (1918). Later, ~ Colegr_ove_ v. · 
Green, 328 U.S. 549 (1946), petitioners alleged that the congressional districts 
created by Illinois law were malapportioned under the fourteenth amendment. 
Mr. Justice Fran~f;1-rter, writing for the majority, declare~ ~~t the illsu~ w:15 ~! 
a "peculiarly pohUcal nature and therefore not meet for Judiaal detenn1nat10.n. 
Id. at 552. For practical purposes. Colegrove wa& overruled by Baker v. Carr, 
369 U.S. 186 (1962). However, Professor Bickel argues that Baker v. Carr does 
not deny the "essence" of Colegrove, because Colegrove did not hold that the 
Court may nevm- interfere with the electoral process. Bickel, The Durability of 
Colegrove v. Green, 72 YALE L. J. 39 (1962). 
"369 U.S. 186 (1962). 
• 395 U.S. at 518-9. 
• 369 U.S. at 210. 
"Id. at 217. A political question was also deemed to exist where there was 
present "a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for. resolving 
it; or the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of a 
kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion; or the impossibility of a court's under-
taking independent resolution without expressing lack of respect due coordinate 
branches of government; or an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a 
political decision already made; or the potentiality of embarrassment from 
multifarious pronouncements by various departments on one question." Id. 
•• The general subjects which the courts have traditionally deemed "politi· 
cal" are: negotiations violation and termination of treaties; beginning and ending 
of wars; admission and deportation of aliens;. jurisdiction over territories; 
recognition of states and governments; war and measures short of war; status of 
Indian tribes; and the guaranty of republican form of government. Field, The 
Doctrine of Political Questions in the Federal Ca-urts, 8 MINN. L. REV. 485 (1924-). 
"369 U.S. at 210-11. 
12 395 U.S. at 519. Respondents based their claim on Ar tide l, section 5 of the 
Constitution. See note l, supra. 
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the constitutional commitment to Congress of the power to judge 
the qualifications of its own members."' 
Chief Justice Warren relied on historical precedent, which he 
divided into three basic periods," in order to support the Court's 
decision that both Houses of Congress are without authority to 
exclude any duly elected person who meets the constitutional quali-
fications for membership.'" The Chief Justice concluded that the 
pre-Constitutional Convention cases of Parliamentary exclusion, 
including, notably, the Robert Walpole case, "demonstrate that a 
member could be excluded if he had first been expelled."'" Never-
theless, over a century later, the exclusion of John Wilkes from the 
House of Collilllons, contemporanous with the American Revolu-
tion, had a profound effect on the Founding Fathers.'' Wilkes was 
expelled from Commons for seditious libel in 1763, and, although 
re-elected five times, was denied his seat until 1782." Chief Justice 
Warren agreed with the petitioners' conclusion that the Founding 
Fathers manifested their intention to deny Congress the power to 
alter the constitutional qualification for membership.'' Accordingly, 
for nearly one hundred years, Congress "limited its power to judge 
the qualifications of its members to those enumerated in the Con-
stitution.""' 
""The Court had applied the. Baker rest in Bond v. Floyd, 385 U.S. 116 
(1966), and concluded that the judiciary has the power to review a state 1egisla-
ture's exclusion of a duly elected member. Id. at 131. Julian Bond was elected 
to the Georgia House of Representatives in 1965 and subsequently endorned a 
Student Coordinating Committee statement against the government's Vietnam 
policy. The House refused to seat him on the grounds that the statements aided 
the enemy, violated the selective service laws, discredited the House and were 
inconsistent with the oath of office required of House members. Bond met the 
constitutional requirements of age, citizenship and residency (GA. CONST. mt. 
Ill, § 6), but the district court held that Bond had not been denied due pro-
cess and that the House had a rational basis for excluding him, Furthennore, 
the district court stated that to grant Bond relief would be to "crash through a 
political thicket into a political quicksand." Powell v. McCmmack, 266 F. Supp. 
354, 359 (D.D.C. 1967). The Supreme Court reversed the district court and 
established judicial review of the exclusionary action of a state legislature. 
However, the. political question doctrine still remained a potential barrier to 
review of congressional decision. 
1
• 395 U.S. at 522-48. Chief Justice Warren's periods are "the pre-conven· 
lion precedent!;". "convention debates" and "post-ratification". Id. 
1 Id. at 522. The Constitution specifically empowers both Homes to expel a 
member by a two-thirds vote. U.S. CoNST. art. I, § 5. 
u!d. at 527. 
"Id. at 530. 
18 Id. at 527 -8. 
"'Id, at 532. Note specifically the pre-c9nvention & State convention debates. 
"'Id. at 542. . .. 
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In 1807 the House of Representatives seated William Mc-
Creery, who met the constitutional qualifications for membership 
but did not meet additional residency requirements imposed by the 
st:1.te of Maryland. The House election committee declared that 
Congress cannot "prescribe" the qualifications of its members, but, 
rather, it can only "judge" members in light of the Constitution.'" 
Subsequent congressional practice has been "erratic", and some 
members-elect meeting the constitutional requirements have been 
excluded. However, Chief Justice Warren pointed out that even if 
the criteria for exclusion had been more consistent, their prece-
dential value would nevertheless be quite limited, since an act is not 
rendered any less unconstitutional merely because it is repeated at a 
later date."" History, therefore, confirms the conclusion of the 
Powell court that "the Hous_e is without power to exclude any 
member-elect who meets the Constitutional qualifications_ for mem-
bership.""" Furthermore, even had the intent of the Framers been 
less apparent, the Court would nevertheless "have been compelled 
to resolve any ambiguity in favor of a narrow construction of the 
scope of Congress' power to exclude member-elect.''"" 
As a pragmatic technique of avoiding judicial review of potenti-
ally embarrassing issues, the political question doctrine historically 
has been highly effective. Underlying the Court's understandable 
reluctance to adjudicate thorny palitical questions is the judiciary's 
obvious lack of the physical power to enforce its decisions. Regard-· 
less of the strength of the theoretical foundations of a particular 
course of judicial action, as a practical matter, the Court cannot 
recklessly risk having its decisions ignored by the other branches. 
It is arguable, however, that Marbury v. ·Madison"' established 
the principle that "it is emphatically the province and duty of the 
21 Id. at 543. 
"'Id. at 546-7 . 
..,id. at 547. But see The Supreme Court, 1968 Term, 83 HA1t.V. L. R.Ev. 
62, 71-75 (1969) . 
"'Id. 
""5· UiS. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). Two of the three issues which Professor 
Van Alstyne has pinpointed in Marbury v. Madison could easily be transposed 
ont.o the issues of Powell v. McCormack- "(1) Was the Secretary of State ans-
werable in court for the conduct of his office? (2) Could the Court countermand 
a pr~idential decision respecting a subordinate appointment? (3) By what means 
could any such judicial decision possibly be enforced?" Van Alstyne, A. Critical 
Guide to Marbury v. Madison, 1969 Dmrn L- J. l, 5 (1969). In the Powell case, 
the issues could be (1) Was the House answerable to the Court for the con.-
duct of its office? (2) Could the Court countermand a congressional decision 
r.egarding legislative execlusion? 
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judicial department to say what the law is,""" and that there is a 
qualitative difference between the Court's interpretation of the 
law and its usurpation of a function of a coordinate branch of 
government." In the Powell case, the Court was called upon to 
grant declaratory relief" - to declare that Powell had unconstitu-
tionally been deprived of his seat in the House of Representatives. 
It was not called upon actually to seat Powell. This distinction, al-
though perhaps difficult to ascertain, is the essential distinction 
between the functions of the judiciary and those of the other branch-
es of government. Viewed in ,this manner, the political barriers of 
the Baker definition, notably a commitment to a coordinate branch, 
would become iminaterial.28 
The vagueness of Article I, section 5 of the United States Con-
stitution has led to considerable disagreement among legal scholars 
as to the power of judicial review over the congressional· determina-
tion of the qualifications of its members."° The.Constitution does not 
declare that Congress is to be the sole judge of the qualifications of 
"'5 U.S. (I Cranch) 177 (1803) (emphasis added). 
"Professor Finkelstein, who long ago charged the Court with a pragmatic 
application of the political question doctrine, has suggested tbat the doctrine 
of separation of powers which was employed in the Baker and Powell decision, 
is useless as a .principle and even as a guide for the decision of cases. Finkelstein, 
Judicial SelfLimitatiO'fl, 37 HARv. L. REv. 338, 344 (1924); Finkelstein, Further 
Notes on Judicial Self-Limitation, 39 HARV. L REv. 221, 223 (1925). He argued 
that the courts ar,e called upon to determine by whom certain powers shall be 
exercised and if the pawers thus possessed have been validly exercised.. The 
determination of the validity of an act is a different function from the actual 
performance of the act: "Ciln the one case wt.; are seeking to ascertain upon 
who devolves the duty of the particular service; in the other case we are merely 
seeking to determine whether the Constitution has _been violated by anything 
done or attempted by either an executive official or the legislature." Id. 
""Petitioner's request for mandamus for back pay was remanded to the 
district court. 395 U.S. at 550. · 
.. !169 U.S. at 217, 
00 Judge Learned Hand has noted that the text of the Constiti911 at its emer-
gence from the· Constitutional Convention in 1787 gave no ground for infening 
that the decisions of the Supreme Court a."l.d, a f-0rtwri of the lower courts, were 
to be authoritative vis-a-vis the legiBlature and executive; On the other hand, 
without some arbiter of who was to make the final decision. the entire system 
would have oollapsed; and it has been an accepted rule in the interpretation 
of · documents to interpolate into the text such provisions as are essential to 
prevent the defeat of the "venture at hand". L. Hand, TME Bn.L OF Rmlffll 14, 15, 
27, 29 (1958). This Power, Hand concluded, "is not a logkal deduction from the 
sturcture of the Constitution, but only a practical condition upon its applica· 
tion." Id. at 15. For the same approach, see Bickel, Forward: the Pas8ive Virtues, 
75 HARV. L. REV. 40 (1961). 
Professor Wechsler, disagreeing with Judge Hand, concluded that what is 
crucial is "not the nature of the question hut the natu:re of the answer th~t may 
be validly given by the courts", and that the poWer of Congress to jlidg!,!! the 
6
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its members,"' and there is no apparent textual reason why Article 
I, section 5 prevents judicial intervention. The ambiguous language 
precludes an effective denial of judicial review on the basis of textual 
commitment to Congress, as the Court makes evident in the Powell 
decision .. Even the commitment of a question to a coordinate branch 
of government would not necessarily render a question "palitical" 
and therefore nonjusticiable."" The Powell case seems to establish 
that subject matter or question alone, even when another depart-
ment or branch is primarily concerned with it, does not forestalr 
the courts from deciding the matter in question ... Nor does the 
"potentiality of embarrassment" from coordinate branches pose an 
insurmountable barrier to judicial review."" 
Diana Eve1'ett 
qualifications of its members is beyond judicial review. Wechsler, T07))aTd Neutml 
Principles of Canstitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REv. 1, 15 {1959). 
Professor Scharpf has viewed the political que;tion doctrine as a discretionary 
technique of avoidance, the effect of which is quite different from that of avoid-
ance on jurisdictional or procedural grounds. Scharpf, Judicial Review &: the 
Political Questioo: A FunctiO'l'lal Analysis, 75 YA:ut L .. J. 517, 536-!17 (1966). 
Grants of power pursuant to Article 1, section 5 are essentially adjudicative 
Scharpf concluded. Therefore, it is reasonable to construe the authorization of 
these powers to Congress as an explicit exception to the Article I1i[ grant of 
judicial power. Id. at 539-40. 
Mr. Ralph Bean had concluded in a recent numbeT of this Review that Baker 
v. Carr and subsequent decisions have led to the demise of the thn~e general 
principles underlying the political question doctrine, namely, the Court's 
non-interferrence with a matteT committed to another branch, the lack of judi-
cially manageable standards and· "judicial non-intervention where the organiza-
tion of a government is the basis of the complaint." Bean, The Supeme Courl 
and the Political Question: Affirmation or Abdication'!, 71 W. VA. L. R.Ev. 97. 
130 (1969). "The short of it is that respect for federalmm and the principle of 
separation of powers as between the federal judiciary and the states have been 
subordinated to concepts of individual liberty and equality for which the 
Court claims to have no difficulty discovering standards." Id. at 1!11. 
""U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 5. The Constitution does grant the Senate the sole 
power to impeach . 
.. !195 U .s. at 521. 
""Wesbetty v. Sanders, 376 U.S. l (1963). In his dissenting opinion, Mr. 
Justice Harlan insisted that Congress has exclusive supervisory powers under 
U.S. CoNST. art. l, § § 2, 4, 5. Id. at_ 23. See also Judge Tuttle's district court dis-
sent in Wesberry v. SandeT~, 206 F, Supp. 276, .285 (1962), which the Supreme 
Court noted.approvingly in Wesberry. · 
_ .. See Tollett, Political Questions mid the Loo!, 42 U. D:ii:r. 1.. J. 439, 468-70 
(1965); cf. The Supreme. Court, 1968 Term, 83 HARV. L. R.Ev. 62 (1969}. 
.. 369 U.S. at 217. The philosophical trend of the Baker and Powell decisions 
was anticipated by Professor Weston in 192!,. "[T]be line between judicial 
any political questions in given constitutional situation is the line drawn by 
constitutional delegation and none other_ The actual delegation as it bas 
occurred has depended upon men's current beliefs as to what ought to be dele-
gated, upon their political and social theories and their notions of expediency." 
Westoni, Political Questions, .. HARv. L. REY. 296, 331 (1925). 
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